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/lo Introduction 

LIMIT'OF CIVIL LIABILITY OF -CARRIERS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAND TRANSPORT IN'LATIN AMERICA: ' 
- ' CRITERIA FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT . " .<" 
I» Introduction 
Pursuant to a plan of work approved by the member countries 
of the Commission at its seventeenth session held inf Guatemala 
City in May 1977» an Ad Hoc, Group of. Experts was convened by CEPAL 
to prepare a preliminary draft Latih' Alteri can Convention on the 
Civil Liability of Carriers in International Land Transport. 
During the course of one meeting held at CEPAL headquarters 
from 29 November to 2 December 1977i the Group of Experts requested 
the CEPAL secretariat to prepare a study on the effects of establishing 
relatively high or low limits of liability for. carriers in international 
land transport. Thjfei •^ '̂tin^nt/'pii'i'it'iflin : report 1/ states that: 
"15. * The Group of Experts did not' attempt to reach a consensus 
......oil what, the limit of l iability in article 6 of the draft 
Convention should be, since'this will be finally determined 
•at the meeting-of jilenipotentiaries. ' Nonetheless, it -
considers . that there are ..significant arguments both in 
favor of a high ceiling and.of a low one. The Group 
therefore suggests that, in order'to aid the negotiations 
of the plenipotentiaries,, the CEPAL secretariat should 
prepare a study on this aspect, covering inter alia the 
following considerations: 
(a) The relation between this ceiling and the total 
cost of-the premium paid by the shipper to the cargo-
insurer, or the premium paid by the carrier to his. 
civil l iability insurer and passed on in the charges 
' for freight or : Services rendered; 
1/. CEPAL,. Re-port of the Group of Experts on the meeting, to draw up 
a draft Latin American convention on the c iv i l l i ab i l i t y . o f 
carriers in international land ' transport (E/CEPAL/lOV?). -
/(b) The ceiling 
(b) The ceiling established by th« United Nations 
Conference on.the. Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg, 
March 1978) and the advantages of having uniformity 
between the ceiling adopted in Latin America and that 
applicable to carriage by eea; 
(c) The possibility that Latin American insurers will 
offer carriers civil l iability insurance ,at, different 
levels of maximum liabil ity; 
(d) The problem of :risk concentration, especially in 
ports and cargo terminals in the interior; 
(eX The. way in which civil l iability insurance for 
the different types of carriers is quoted and applied 
in various parts of the world; and 
( f ) The relation between the ceiling and the number of 
legal actions that might be brought." 
2. Legal basis of carrier l iabil ity 
The demand for and the supply of transport services are influenced 
by the extent of the legal obligations imposed upon carriers. One such 
legal obligation is the amount; by which carriers must respond to 
consignees for failure to deliver goods free from loss, damage or 
delay. The amount of compensation .payable by carriers for such damages 
is determined by the provisions of'the applicable hâtiônal law or 
transport convention, 
(a) National laws • <••-•.•. 
As no international land transport convention exists at present 
for Latin America; transport between any two or more countries of the 
region is governed by each country's commercial code while the goods 
are transported through that country, and the provisions Qf the.. 
contracts of carriage. Three commercial codes representative of Latin 
America— those of Brazil , Chile and ..Mexico.. were therefore studied 
to determine the liability "exposure of carriers for loss, damage and 
delay in delivery of goods in national transport. 
/In al l 
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In al l three of the commercial codes studied, the domestic 
carriers have been assigned unlimited liability for loss or damage 
to goods in national transport. For example, the Commercial Code 
of Mexico provides in the Tenth Title, Article 590 (IX) that: 
"The carrier shall pay for losses or damages for which he 
is responsible in accordance with the price which in the 
judgement of experts the mereandise would have had on the 
day and in the place in which it was to be delivered, the 
experts being required to take into account the indications 
in the way b i l l . " 
These same commercial codes establish an unlimited liability 
for carriers to pay compensation for damages occasioned by delays 
in delivery. For example, the Commercial Code of Chile provides in 
Book I I , Title V, Article ¡206", that: 
"Where a fine is stipulated in compensation for the delay, 
the consignee shall be empowered to. collect it by the mere 
fact of the delay and without need of proving injury, and 
to deduct the amount from the agreed price. 
The payment of the fine does not exempt the carrier, from 
the obligation of compensation for injuries which the 
person interested in the arrival of the merchandise may 
have suffered from, the direct or immediate effects of the 
delay." , ... — / 
Thus, as land transport:within the Latin American region is currently 
governed by the applicable commercial code, carriers are subject to 
an unlimited liability exposure for loss or damage to cargo, as well 
as for delay in delivery. 
b) International law 
( i ) Liability ceilings for goods lost or damaged. The 
compensatory provisions in both the International Convention concerning 
the Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM) 2/ and the Convention on the 
Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) 
2/ International Convention concerning the Carriage of Goods by 
Rail (Convention internationale concernant le transport des 
marchandises-par chemins de fer: CIM) ,done at Berne on 7 February 
1970, applicable since 1 January 1975-
2/ Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods 
by Roàd (Convention relative au contrat de transport international 
de marchandises par route: CMR), done at Geneva on 19 May 1956, 
applicable since 2 July 1961. / . 
if -
base a shipper's recovery on the value of the goods lost or damaged 
with a l iability ceiling of a stated amount per kilogram. For 
example, CMR in article 23 provides that: 
"When under the provision of this Convention, a carrier is 
liable ;for compensation in respect of total or partial loss 
of goods, such compensation shall be calculated by reference 
to the value of the goods at the place and time at which the 
were accepted for carriage. _ 
Compensation, shall not, however, exceed. 25 francs per kilogram 
of gross weight short.k "Franc" means, the gold franc weighing 
10/31 of a gramme and being millesimal fineness 900." 
The compensatory provisions in both the International Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules relating.to Bills of Lading k/ 
and the Convention .for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to 
International Carriage by Air ¿/, better known as the Hague Rules 
and Warsaw Convention respectively, provide only for a maximum 
liability per package, unit or kilogram. For example, the Hague 
Rules in article paragraph 5» provide that:, 
"Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or 
become liable for any loss "or damage to or in connection 
with goods in an amount exceeding 100 pounds sterling per 
package or unit or the equivalent of that-sum in other 
currency unless the nature and value of such goods hâve 
been.declared by the shipper,before shipment and inserted 
in the b i l l of lading." 
Although the Hague Rules and Warsaw.Convention provide only for a 
maximum liability per package, unit of kilogram, they implicitly 
limit an injured shipper's compensation to the value of the goods 
lost or damaged if that value is below such maximum. Thus, under 
CIM, CMR, the Hague Rules and the Warsaw Convention the responsible 
carrier would compensate an injured shipper with the value of the 
k/ Done in Brussels on 25 August 192*+; applicable since 2 June 1931 
(see United Nations, Register of Texts of Conventions and other 
instruments concerning international trade law, New York, 1973 
(Sales number: E.73-V.3))„ ' . "" : ' 
¿/ Done in Warsaw on 12 October 1929, amended in The Hague in 1955 
(see ICAO, Annual Council Repo-rt-1977 document 9233).; applicable 
?ince 1 August 1963. . . / l o s t o r 
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lost or damaged goods or thé liability ceiling as indicated in the 
applicable transport convention,, whichever value is lower. 
( i i ) Liability ceilings for delay in delivery. The compensatory 
provisions for delay in delivery of the goods transported by land, sea 
and air vâry greatly. In Europèan international land transport both 
CIM and CMR compute the shipper's compensation using the freight charges 
as a basis. For example CMR in article 23 provides that: 
"In the case of delay,; i f the claimant proves that damage has 
resulted therefrom the carrier shall pay compensation for such 
damage not exceeding the carriage charges. 
While CIM also uses freight charges to compute a shipper's compensation 
for delay in delivery, it separates such compensation into a nominal 
payment of 1/10 of the freight charges where the shipper has not been 
injured, and double freight charges where the shipper has received an 
actual injury. 
Although the Hague Rules do not lay down obligations for the ocean 
carrier in the case of delayed delivery, the Convention on the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) 6/ — which is to ultimately replace 
the Hague Rules ~ establishes such responsibility at two and a half 
times the freight payable for the goods delayed, but not exceeding the 
total freight payable under the contract of' carriage. Thus, in Europèan 
international land transport and in the new ocean transport convention, 
a carrier's obligation for delay in delivery does not directly seek to 
compensate the injured shipper but rather to eliminate the income from 
a carriage that results in delayed delivery. 
The Guatemala Protocol (1971) to the Warsaw Convention places 
a different monetary liability upon carriers for delay in delivering 
passengers, their baggage, and general cargo. For example, the monetary 
6/ Done in Hamburg in March 1978 (see United Nations, General 
Assembly, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the 
carriage of goods by sea, 1978 (A/CONF.89/13). 
/liability for 
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l iability for delayed delivery of cargo is 250 francs per kilogram 7/° 
3. Insurance in transport 
Since international market transactions involving the movement 
of goods are seldom free from risk, these operations are heavily 
dependent on adequate insurance coverage from potential loss.» There-
fore, owners, carriers, financial institutions and any other person 
who will benefit from the timely and injury-free arrival of the goods 
or suffer financial injury through their being lost, damaged or delayed 
in delivery, have insurable interests. Although it is evident that 
both carriers and owners will try to transfer these risks through 
insurance, it should not be overlooked that both the insured amount 
and the policy costs are directly related to the level of civil liability 
imposed upon carriers. Furthermore, before discussing the relationship 
between the insurance covering the carrier's professional l iabi l ity, 
cargo insurance purchased by shippers and the carrier's level of civil 
l iability, a careful distinction must be made between the insurable 
interests of the carrier and the shipper, which originate from totally 
different sources of risks and therefore require equally different 
types of insurance coverage, 
(a) Insurable interests 
An owner's insurable interest in goods arises directly from his 
> ' • . 
property interest in such goods which creates a need for cargo insurance 
In case of loss, the cargo insurer will merely satisfy himself that 
the loss occurred and that it was proximately caused by an insured 
risk. As the compensations for such an injury was previously negotiated 
between the cargo owner and his insurer, payment of the claim will 
usually be made without undue delay. Thus, cargo insurance requires 
only that there was a loss as provided by the insurance contract; there 
are no questions involving negligence of the carrier. .. 
7/ For purposes of this Protocol, consists of 65 1/2 milligrams of 
gold being millesimal fineness 900. 
/A carr ier ' s 
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A carrier's insurable interest., - on the other hand, arises from 
provisions within the contract of.carriage, national laws and applicable 
international conventions establishing standards of care for the goods 
transported. These standards of care establish clearly defined risks 
for carriers, and hence many carriers choose to insure their civil 
* 
l iability« Any failure on the carrier's,part to observe these standards 
of care for the transport of goods will establish, if thè goods are 
proximately insured thereby; an obligation to compensate the owner of 
such goods or thè person representing him. • . 
Obviously , establishing the ? existence of negligence on the 
carrier's part involvés both questions of fact and law, and litigation 
is not infrequent. Thus, it would take the cargo.owner much longer 
to obtain settlement under professional l iability insurance than under 
cargo insurance and he would not necessarily be fully compensated for 
his loss. . 
(b) Double insurance 
As the insurable interests of both the carrier and cargo owner 
originate from totally different sources of risks, it is incorrect 
to assert that the existence of professional liability.insurance and 
cargo insurance represent a costly duplication of transport insurance. 
Without cargo insurance— which normally includes extensive "a l l -
r risks" coverage — cargo owners would- be exposed to thè danger of loss 
or damage to their'goods due to causes beyond the carrier's respon-
sibility as established by national laws and international conventions 
and.would find credit for their business transactions difficult to 
obtain. Similarly, without professional l iability insurance, carriers 
would have to bear risks far exceeding their financial capacities« 
Therefore, a certain degree of coexistence of cargo insurance and 
carrier's professional l iability insurance seems necessary. 
/This coexistence 
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This coexistence would constitute double insurance if cargo 
owners were permitted a double recovery — from the carrier's 
professional l iability insurer and his own cargo insurer — for an 
injury to the goods; or if the premium rating for cargo insurance 
did not take into account the total past experience — including 
subrogation recoveries from professional l iability insurers —r o,f 
cargo owners. 
An insured cargo owner will normally f i le a claim with his 
cargo insurer upon the occurrence of a loss-producing event. If the 
loss was produced by an insured risk, the cargo insurer will pay the 
previously^agreed compensation and take an assignment of a l l the 
cargo owner's rights and remedies against the responsible carrier, 
thereby preventing the cargo owner from obtaining more than ful l 
indemnity. The cargo insurer will then seek via subrogation to recover 
said compensation from the responsible carrier's professional l iabil ity 
insurer. 
Subrogation recoveries received by the cargo insurer are a factor 
in rating cargo insurance. Such ratings are based on past experience, 
and part of that past experience is related to subrogation recoveries 
from carriers or their professional l iabil ity insurers. Cargo insurance . 
ratings then, are usually based on the experienced net cost of coverage 
after deducting such recoveries. As the doctrine of subrogation prevents 
cargo owners from obtaining more than fu l l indemnity and allows greater 
accuracy in calculating experience rating for cargo insurance, any 
overlap in risk bearing between professional l iabil ity insurance and 
cargo insurance is precluded, 
(c) Relative costs of transport insurance 
Cargo insurers, when extending coverage to the owners of goods 
know in advance the property to be transported and the risks involved 
in a specific means of transport. This situation allows cargo insurers 
to accurately rate the sum insured against the property at risk. Thus, 
/cargo insurers 
cargo insurers may tailor coverage to suit: the specific requirements 
of a cargo owner, . ., . , • 
, On the other hand as professional l iability insurers do not 
know in advance, the specific property to be transported nor al l the 
risks involved in such transport, no sum insured can be properly 
rated against the property at risk. 
This uncertainty as to. the nature of possible, l iabil ity claims 
and of the amounts involved for professional liability insurance 
leads to a higher premium cost than that paid for cargo insurance when 
it covers a given risk at an equal degree of compensation. For example, 
in Europe the premium for carrier's professional l iability insurance 
is a percentage of the carriage chargés and unrelated to either the 
value of the goods or the risks involved in such transport. The 
uncertainty as to the' risks involved in à carrier's professional 
activities is even greater when there is no fixed ceiling on his 
civil l iabi l ity; 
k. Criteria for establishing a civil l iability ceiling for 
carriers in international land transport in Latin America 
(a) Objectives pursued in determining a liability ceiling 
The Latin „American Convention on civil l iability of carriers 
in international land transport is intended to form part of those 
multilateral and bilateral agreements in transport, customs, banking 
and other regulations that provide the basis for carrying out inter-
Latin American trade, i . e . , which form the institutional infrastructure 
of trade and international transport. This institutional infrastructure 
has the same degree of importance as the physical infrastructure, that 
is, the ports, highways and railways used for the transport of each 
country's exports and imports. Both types of infrastructure should 
be improved in Latin America. However, the need for a modern institu-
tional infrastructure is much more striking as the existing 
/institutional infrastructure 
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institutional infrastructure results from a reduced historical 
importance of trade among the Latin American countries. 
Since a convention establishing standards of care that should 
be observed by the carrier in the exercise of his professional 
activities is only one element of this institutional infrastructure, 
it is necessary to keep in mind the major objectives pursued in order 
to ensure that the effects of the convention and such objectives will 
be compatible. The Latin American countries have indicated among 
others, the following objectives: 
( i ) To promote the growth of international inter-Latin American 
trade ; 
( i i ) To minimize the total cost which shippers have to pay 
for all necessary'services; 
( i i i ) To créâte conditions, that will lead to the existence of 
a suitable structure for the regional land transport industry; 
(iv) To assure an adequate distribution of cargoes among the 
differënt'. mb&es. of land transport and a more advantageous use of 
their complementary possibilities; 
(v) To provide sufficient incentive which ensures that all 
persons in the international transport chain have an interest in 
taking necessary precautions to see that goods reach their destination 
in a timely and injury-free condition. 
(vi) To promote the increased participation of Latin American 
insurers in the regional insurance market; 
(vi i ) To see that the rules governing international land transport 
are clear and simple to apply. 
(b) Relationship between the carrier's l iability ceiling and other 
variables 
Thé possible effect on these objectives of the amount and unit 
of account limiting the civil l iability of the carrier cannot be analysée 
unless a number of other variables with which they are closely related 
/are simultaneously 
are simultaneously taken into account. The effect of a relatively high 
or low ceiling on such objectives is generally indirect, i .e., , through 
other variables such as the cost of the cargo insurance premium. 
However, there are certain variables such as the standards of care 
whiph the carrier is expected to observe and the level,of l iability 
ceiling that are ..directly related,, 
In fact, the liability ceiling in a. large measure will determine 
the standards of care., 
Such standards of.care directly influence the cost of protecting 
the cargo from loss or damage; therefore, the .stricter the standards, 
the greater the care which carriers must.take in handling cargo, and 
consequently the higher the costs of handling.and supervision if they 
wish to obtain professional l iability insurance, coverage at reasonable 
prices. It is a fact that the cost .of professional l iability .insurance 
will be heavier for those carriers with.a greater loss experience rating 
and this will.act as an incentive for .carriers to handle.with care the 
goods entrusted to them for carriage at the risk of being outsted from 
market competition as the result-of high freight rates. It must be 
recognized, however, that carriers assign, a high degree importance.to 
the careful handling of cargo for which they are responsible and that 
this stems from their desire to provide a good-quality service in order 
to attract more business from shippers.. 
Protection of cargo from loss or damage represents a cost to 
carriers in terms of an investment in .the means for cargo handling and 
supervision. Such investment is directly related 1;o the standards, of 
care required of and to the maximum civil l iability ceiling established 
for carriers. Carriers should.be willing if they have sufficient 
information concerning their operations and are acting prudently, to 
invest in supervision and handling facilities ,iAp to the point where 
such investments represent an adequate return compared with the alter-
native costs of compensating for cargo loss or damage. If the liability 
/ceiling established 
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ceiling established for carriers is too low, their interest in 
protecting the cargo will obviously diminish« 
On the other hand, if the ceiling is too high, carriers will 
have a strong incentive to invest in facilities which will ensure 
care in handling of cargo. However, only up to the point where the 
marginal cost of such investment equals the marginal payment for 
loss or damage to the cargo. If the carrier does not insure his 
professional l iabil ity, he will then compare the cost of investment 
in such handling equipment to the potential compensations he would 
have to pay directly to fehippers for any loss or damage to the cargo. 
On the other hand, if professional l iability insurance has been 
purchased, as will normally be the case, a carrier's decision on how 
much to invest in cargo handling equipment and other loss prevention 
measures will depend on the relative improving of his loss experience 
rating due to that investment. 
The foregoing observations indicate that a l iabil ity ceiling 
for the carrier should be set at least a value that will encourage 
carriers to invest in handling facilities and supervision for the care 
of the cargo. Such investments should be up to an amount that will 
permit carriers to reach a minimal level of loss or damage and a 
minimal cotìt of professional l iabil ity insurance and cargo insurance. 
Another of the variables of great influence in considering the 
establishment of a maximum civil l iabil ity ceiling for carriers is 
the manner of calculation and payment of professional l iabil ity 
insurance premiums and the way in which the cost of such premiums is 
transferred to shippers. Unfortunately, Latin America lacks experience 
regarding professional l iabil ity insurance policies for carriers. 
In Europe, where there exists experience with professional 
l iability insurance for carriers the premium is calculated as a 
/percentage of 
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percentage of the freight charge for transport« In this case, the 
effect of a high ceiling is to increase the cost of insurance for 
a l l goods without discrimination as to value, which is detrimental 
to cargoes with a value below that of the ceiling. 
One of the objectives pursued in the preparation of the 
institutional infrastructure in Latin America is to facilitate a 
greater participation of Latin American insurance companies in the 
regional insurance market. The capacity of the regional insurance 
industry to cover the civil l iabil ity risks of carriers in interna-
tional land transport is small at present because of the lack of a 
ceiling on that l iabil ity, and obviously the lower the ceiling 
established, the greater will be the possibilities of Latin American 
insurers covering this type of risk without having to resort to jreinsurnace 
with companies outside the region. Nevertheless, i f the ceiling were 
excessively low, carriers would have no incentive to obtain liability 
insurance. 
In section 3 on transport insurance it was noted that as a result 
of existing international trade practices, shippers will continue to base 
their actions to obtain compensation for loss or damage on cargo insurance. 
Although the amount of cargo insurance is uninfluenced either by ex-
tensive or limited professional liability insurance coverage or by a 
high or low maximum liability ceiling, such is not the case.with 
professional l iabil ity insurance. The amount and cost of carriers' 
professional l iability insurance coverage is influenced directly by 
the amount of the l iabil ity ceiling. The greater the carrier's maximum 
liabil ity ceiling'the greater the insurance coverage needed and, hence 
the cost to shippers. In order to minimize transport insurance costs 
it is necessary to select a maximum liability ceiling that will reduce 
the carrier's need for professional l iability insurance while at the 
same time providing carriers financial incentives to institute loss 
prevention measures for the goods transported. 
/From an 
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From an examination of the relationship between the liability 
ceiling and a number of other variables, such as care of the cargo, 
the capacity of insurance companies to cover carriers' civil 
l iability risks, the total cost of insurance in the transport operation, 
etc., it will be seen that there would be serious disadvantages if too 
high or too low a ceiling were established. Nevertheless, this examination 
has not provided criteria for determining what level would be too high 
or too low. It is therefore necessary to consider other aspects which 
can provide quantitative criteria that will assist in establishing an 
appropriate civil l iabil ity ceiling for Latin America. Two of such 
criteria are the level of l iability ceiling established by the Hamburg 
Rules and the composition of inter-Latin American trade. 
The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
1978, was signed at Hamburg 8/ ('Hamburg Rules)' on 30 March 1978. This 
Convention, adopted as a result of intensive work by UNCITRAL and UNCTAD 
will come into force one year after it has been ratified by 20 countries, 
and from that moment it will replace the Hague Rules which now govern 
international maritime transport. 
As regards the civil l iability ceiling of ocean carriers, the 
Hamburg Rules establish the amount of 2.5 SDRs 9/ per kilogram of gross 
8/ The fourteen signatory countries included six Latin American 
States: Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. 
2/ The special drawing right (SDR) is a unit of value established by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which may be used,as a 
relatively stable unit of account for international operations. 
Its value in United States dollars is determined daily by adding 
the values in dollars, at the market exchange rate, of certain 
proportions of the currencies of the 16 countries with the most 
important role in international trade. At 31 May 1978 its value 
was I.21985 dollars. The value, of the SDR is any currency other 
than the United States dollar is obtained by means bf the exchange 
rate of that currency to the United States dollar and the value 
of the SDR. in dollars. . . . , . . . - • 
/weight. According 
weight. According to parity of the SDK at the end of May 1978, the 
ceiling was equivalent to 3.05 dollars per kilogram, or 3,030 dollars 
per metric ton» 
The adoption of SDKs in the new Hamburg Rules follows the world 
trend towards using this unit in international conventions, both in 
new conventions and in amendments to existing ones. Due to the demone-
tization of gold and the floating of the United States dollar vis-a-vis 
other currencies, experience has shown that values expressed in these 
units have lost the relationship they had with the currencies of many 
of the signatory countries of the conventions at the time they were 
ratified. 
The draft Latin American Convention which will be considered at 
the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting on civil l iability carriers 
in international land transport is applicable to "the activity whereby 
goods are carried by land, handled or stored, for reward, when such 
operations form part of the movement of goods from the territory of one 
State to that of another" (article 1, paragraph 1), and where such 
movement is "between signatory States" (article 2, paragraph 1). Thus, 
the Convention is applicable to operations carried out in a signatory 
country when such operations precede or follow maritime transport 
between signatory countries. Likewise, the Convention is applicable 
when, either before or after maritime transport to or from a non-sign-
atory country, international land transport is effected through two 
signatory countries, as might happen in the Case of a mediterranean 
country. In view of these relationships between the Hamburg Rules and 
the draft Latin American Convention, it seems advisable to determine 
whether there would be any significant benefits from establishing the 
same ceiling as recently adopted in the Hamburg Rules. 
The draft Latin American Convention differs from others of its 
kind in Europe by including within its scope of application both road 
and rail carriers, since in Europe separate conventions exist, and by 
covering other operations such as storage and handling which have not 
yet been the subject of conventions in Europe, although there are some 
under study. The purpose of grouping all of these operations under a 
/single legal 
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single legal regime is, on the one hand, to minimize any differences 
or gaps where the standards:are not clear during the course of an 
international movement of goods and, on the other, to facilitate access 
by shippers whose goods have suffered damage or loss to a court of 
indisputable jurisdictional competence» Underlying this ainu-. is the 
conviction that standard and clearly defined rules would favour growth 
of international trade. 
Furthermore, through the discussions in UNCTAD, by the Inter-
governmental Preparatory Group for a Convention on international 
multimodal transport, it has been seen-that one of the greatest 
difficulties in establishing the system of civil l iability for multi-
modal transport operators is the existing difference between the various 
modes of transport with respect to the civil liability.ceilings for 
carriers. This situation is so serious that it is.generally recognized 
that no system of l iabil ity for multimodal transport operators will be. 
completely satisfactory, nor could it be while the standards of care as 
well as civil l iabil ity ceilings vary so widely .according to whether , 
the goods are. carried by air, sea, rail or road. From this point of 
view, it is fortunate that Latin America, never having adopted a 
convention on civil l iability for land transport in the past, has 
every opportunity of avoiding many of the difficulties .¡encountered, in 
Europe as a result of the growing use of the multimodal transport 
contract. • 
For the reasons explained above, it is realized that there would 
be significant;,.benefits if the civil; l iability ceiling adopted in. the • 
Latin American Convention were the same as that established in the 
Hamburg Rules,, particularly as the standards of care laid down in.the 
draft convention are very similar to those of the Hamburg Rules. 
While uniform rules affecting international trade are in them-
selves advantageous, the establishment of .a l iability ceiling should 
also take into account other important factors. In addition to the 
aspects .already discussed in this section, the relationship between 
this ceiling and the composition ,of .inter-Latin American trade is 
particularly important. To establish an extremely low liabil ity ceiling 
/relative to 
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relative to the value of Latin American trade would mean the application 
of this ceiling to the majority of the claims for loss and damage, 
avoiding in these cases the payment of compensation equal to the value 
of the goods and, as has been seen, reducing the carrier's incentive 
to exercise due care. However, on the other hand, if. an excessively 
high ceiling is fixed relative to the value of the trade involved, this 
would needlessly increase the cost of professional liability insurance 
for carriers and, hence, the tari f fs charged all shippers» 
Although no complete information has been made available on the 
composition of inter-Latin American trade for ranges of value per ton 
carried by land, the following data on Argentine and Brazilian imports 
by road in 1974 are fairly illuminating» 
DISTRIBUTION OF AEGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN IMPORTS CARRIED BY ROAD, 




up to : 
Cumulative percentage of imports 
Argentine 





to According t< 
value 
200 70.6 27.1 39.0 6.4 
400 83.3 37.3 76.2 35.9 
600 86.2 41.1 85.6 47.1 
800 88.3 ' 44.9 89.4 53.6 
1 000 90.2 49.6 94.3 64.4 
1 500 • 94.2 62.5 96.2 70.1 
2 000 •••• 98.3 81.0 97.8 77.2 
2 350 98.5 82.5 98.5 81.0 
2 500 98.9 85.1 98.9 83.3 
3 000 99.3 88.2 99.1 84.5 
3 500 99.4 88.7 99.3 86.8 
4 000 99.5 89.4 99.5 87.8 
4 500 99.5 90.1 99.5 88.5 
5 000 99.6 90.9 99.6 89.5 
Source ; Prepared by CEPAL on the basis of information supplied by 
Argentine and Brazil to the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA). 
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In 197^ the average value of 2.5 SDKs per kilogram expressed in 
dollars per ton was approximately 2,350 dollars. This amount covered 
82.5% of the value of Argentina's imports and 81% of Brazil's imports 
carried by road in 197 ,̂ and 98..5$ of the imports measured by weight, 
in both cases. The adoption of a liability ceiling of 2.5 SDRs per 
kilogram would have meant an effective limit for only 17.5% of 
Argentina's imports and 19$ of Brazil's, according to their value, or 
for less than 2% of their physical volume in both cases. For the 
remainder of the goods the compensation ceiling for loss or damage 
would have been their actual value. Since in any case the ceiling 
covers part of the value of those goods that are above the ceiling, the 
amount of trade remaining without any coverage in Argentina's case is 
only 8.2% and in Brazil's case, 10.2%. 
In order to cover 5% more of the imports according to their 
value, it would have been necessary to raise the ceiling of 2,350 
dollars to nearly 3,000 dollars per ton in the case of Argentina and 
to about 3,500 dollars per ton for Brazil. A ceiling of 3,500 dollars 
per ton in 197 ,̂ taking into account the unit increases in world trade 
prices, would be equivalent to approximately ^,675 dollars per ton in 
Hay 1978. Thi6 rise in the ceiling would of course mean higher freight 
rates for all imports, since, as has already been noted, the cost of 
professional liability insurance is distributed to al l cargo carried 
in proportion to the freight rates. 
From the foregoing considerations it may be inferred that the 
liability ceiling established in the Hamburg Rules maintains a reason-
able relationship with the composition of imports of these two Latin 
American countries which is predominantly carried by road. In view 
of the decided advantages that would result from establishing the 
same ceiling in the Latin American Convention as that in the Hamburg 
Rules, it would seem advisable to give serious consideration to the 
adoption of said ceiling. 

